I thought this was prehaps the most remarkable statements from last week’s debate:
Clinton, who has painted herself as stronger on foreign policy issues than Obama, said Washington should bring other Middle Eastern nations in addition to Israel under a security “umbrella” to create a deterrent against an Iranian threat.
“I think that we should be looking to create an umbrella of deterrence that goes much further than just Israel,” she said.
“We will let the Iranians know, that, yes, an attack on Israel would trigger massive retaliation, but so would an attack on those countries that are willing to go under the security umbrella and forswear their own nuclear ambitions.”
An “umbrella of deterrence”? That’s quite an expansion in America’s commitment to be Middle East peace keeper. Did she really mean it?
Apparently so. Senator Clinton has now upped the ante:
“I want the Iranians to know that if I’m the president, we will attack Iran,” Clinton said. “In the next 10 years, during which they might foolishly consider launching an attack on Israel, we would be able to totally obliterate them.”
Yes, one would expect America to respond to an attack on Israel, and yes, America is certainly “able” to “obliterate” Iran. But why this harsh rhetoric? What does this accomplish?
Clinton elaborated on her plans for a nuclear response on “Countdown with Keith Olbermann” (via Ab2kgj):
Certainly if Iran were to launch an unprovoked attack on another nation, it would be an extraordinary circumstance which might call for an extraordinary response. But I’m very uncomfortable with this kind of escalation in campaign rhetoric. Is it warranted by some sort of immediate threat?
Moreover, as Ab2kgj notes, what happened to that rule against addressing “hypothetical,” crisis-type questions?
CLINTON: We’re not going to engage in these hypotheticals. I mean, one of the jobs of a president is being very reasoned in approaching these issues. And I don’t think it’s useful to be talking in these kind of abstract hypothetical terms.
I don’t understand when the “hypothetical” rule does or does not apply in discussing foreign policy.