I’ve long been skeptical that our military efforts in Afghanistan will conclude with a happy ending. History has shown that occupying forces face strong headwinds when combating entrenched, highly-motivated insurgencies. This is particularly true in the treacherous landscape of Afghanistan–just ask the ancient Greeks, the British, or the Soviets.
For years it’s been apparent that we have no clear exit strategy, or even a clear definition of victory, for that matter. Who and what are we fighting? Ostensibly we’re there to combat the threat of al Qaeda terrorism. Yet CIA Director Leon Panetta recently stated that there may be fewer than 50 al Qaeda in Afghanistan. A majority of the fighters fled to Pakistan. So, as Fareed Zakaria asks, why are we continuing a major offensive in Afghanistan?
Now, last month alone there were more than 100 NATO troops killed in Afghanistan. That’s more than one allied death for each living al Qaeda member in the country in just one month. The latest estimates are that the war in Afghanistan will cost the U.S. more than $100 billion in 2010 alone. That’s a billion dollars for every member of al Qaeda thought to be living in Afghanistan in one year.
Look, I understand that al Qaeda is weak and small because we have been fighting them, chasing them, bombing their leaders. We should continue to do that. But why are we fighting this major war against the Taliban? Well, we fight the Taliban because they are allied with al Qaeda, so say people.
But if al Qaeda itself is so weak, why are we fighting against its allies so ferociously? This would be like fighting Italy in World War II after Hitler’s regime had collapsed and Berlin was in flames just because Italy had been allied with Germany.
The whole enterprise in Afghanistan feels disproportionate, a very expensive solution to what is turning out to be a small but real problem. Beyond the military money, by the way, there’s tens of billions of dollars that flow annually into Afghanistan in aid and logistical support. And how is that money being spent? Well, much of it is literally flying out of Afghanistan.
The “Wall Street Journal” says around $1 billion in cash is flown out of Kabul International Airport every year. As with most countries, private individuals may take money out as long as they declare it. The sums, however, that are leaving Afghanistan are staggering. $2,700,000 in cash is leaving the country every day, and that’s only what’s been declared. So more money is legally flying out of Afghanistan every year than that nation collects in taxes. The “Journal” reports that the exodus is so large U.S. investigators believe top officials in Afghanistan must be funneling billions of dollars to safe havens abroad. Now, some of this is inevitable. You have a very poor country in chaos and then tons of money pouring in from the outside, from the United States, Japan, Europe.
So my concern really remains the core one I started with. Why? Why are we investing so much time, energy, and effort when al Qaeda is so weak? Is there a more cost-effective way to keep al Qaeda on the ropes than fight a major land and air war in Afghanistan?
I would think there is a more cost-effective way: maintain a small network of military bases housing troops that can be deployed for firefights with any known strongholds al Qaeda may establish.
Instead, we’ve opted to go heavy, with nearly 100,000 troops and billions in long-term nation-building projects. In theory, it sounds like a good means of “winning hearts and minds” and establishing a western-friendly government. But in “Why West Lost Afghan War,” Michael Scheuer contends that this approach is doing more damage than good. He asserts that even if we do succeed with such costly nation building projects (e.g., infrastructure improvements), the good will those material things generate still won’t be enough to offset the resentment our occupation creates:
There are 3 million-plus more Afghan children in school today than in 2001; more electricity and potable water are available; many roads and irrigation systems have been rebuilt; and more primary health care is being delivered. Kilcullen, Nagl and their colleagues argued that such success would prompt the Afghans to turn away from the Taliban’s religiosity and nationalism and isolate that purportedly small force from a population swelling with delight and loyalty to Karzai because of material improvements. In short, a social science-powered, mini-New Deal in Afghanistan would win with minimal use of US-NATO military power because Afghans would joyfully jettison God and country for better teeth and smoother roads.
Well, no such thing occurred. As the trend line for these accomplishments rose, the positive trend line for the Taliban-led insurgency rose faster. The once southern-Afghanistan-based insurgency spread across the nation; the Taliban and its allies struck in Kabul at their pleasure; and the large military/social-work operation to clear insurgents from Marjah District in Helmand Province–framed as the test case to validate US-NATO strategy–became, in McChrystal’s words, an endless, ‘bleeding ulcer’ as the Taliban has gradually reasserted control there.
The enraging and unifying impact on Afghans of the US-NATO occupation of the country; Western support for the unrepresentative and corrupt Kabul regime; and the secularizing campaign by Western governmental agencies and NGOs has not and will never be negated by purer water and more refrigeration. The Afghans will appreciate and pocket the material improvements even as more of them take up arms to drive out occupiers they perceive as the enemies of God and Afghanistan. Western leaders should have recalled they’re not fighting Westerners, for whom more ice cubes and tetanus shots might have been enough to give up their faith.
If Scheuer is correct about the mindset of Afghans–I trust he knows more about their culture than I do–this bodes poorly for our prospects of ever having our military fix the failed Afghan state. We’ll never make them happy. We’ll just keep spinning our high-tech wheels in that tribal morass–staying the course!–for X more years and ultimately arrive at a destination not much different from where we are today.
It’s depressing.
