{"id":2188,"date":"2007-04-30T17:54:43","date_gmt":"2007-04-30T21:54:43","guid":{"rendered":"http:\/\/www.brianarner.com\/weblog\/wordpress\/2007\/04\/imminent_threat\/"},"modified":"2007-04-30T17:54:43","modified_gmt":"2007-04-30T21:54:43","slug":"imminent_threat","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"http:\/\/www.brianarner.com\/weblog\/2007\/04\/imminent_threat\/","title":{"rendered":"“Imminent Threat” Redefined"},"content":{"rendered":"

I think a majority of Americans would agree that a preemptive war is justified only against countries that pose an imminent<\/em> threat to Americans. But what does that mean?
\nMerriam-Webster’s<\/a>: “ready to take place; especially : hanging threateningly over one’s head”. Put another way, a clear and present<\/em> danger.
\nTake a look at the novel definition Secretary of State Rice offered yesterday<\/a> on ABC’s This Week<\/em>:<\/p>\n

“I think that — an imminent threat. Certainly Iraq posed a threat,” Rice responds. “The question was, was it going to get worse over time or was it going to get better.”
\nRice goes on to say that the Bush administration assessment was that the threat from Iraq was “getting worse” and had to be dealt with.
\n“But [Iraq was] not an imminent threat,” presses Stephanopoulous.
\n“George, the question of imminence isn’t whether or not someone will strike tomorrow, it’s whether you believe you’re in a stronger position today to deal with the threat or whether you’re going to be in a stronger position tomorrow,” replies Rice. “It was the president’s assessment that the situation in Iraq was getting worse from our point of view.”<\/p><\/blockquote>\n

Lovely. By Rice’s standard, a decision to preemptively attack another country hinges not on their capability to strike us, but rather on our capability to strike them.
\nWhat’s wrong with this picture? First there’s the moral considerations of, you know, killing a bunch of people who don’t pose an immediate danger to you. Then there’s the speculative nature of this policy. Even the best leaders are limited in projecting what risks lie ahead. Clearly, the current White House bunch has demonstrated it’s not too accurate in reading the future.
\nThis is important because unexpected developments might help avert a crisis. What if there’s a change in power, or a regional shift that lessens hostilities? A dispute which appeared like it could head to confrontation might never reach the tipping point. But using Rice’s formulation, a president might decide to launch a war before we even reach such a climax.
\nWhich gets us to Iraq. Even if you buy this imminent threat rationale, the question still stands: why did we have to attack there in the spring of 2003? What was the supposed risk in waiting to attack until 2004? 2005?
\nCall me a cynic, but I suspect political rather than military considerations prompted the decision. Rice suggests that the president is to assess a threat based his ability to launch a war. Back in 2002\/3 America was still coming to terms with 9\/11 and there was plenty of ambiguity about Iraq’s weapons programs. Had Bush waited, support for his war would have been undermined by a less panicked public and by UN weapon’s inspectors busily not finding alleged weapons. So he had to act before the “situation”–i.e., the truth emerging–deteriorated any further.
\nYes, this White House can be that twisted.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

I think a majority of Americans would agree that a preemptive war is justified only against countries that pose an imminent threat to Americans. But what does that mean? Merriam-Webster’s: “ready to take place; especially : hanging threateningly over one’s head”. Put another way, a clear and present danger. Take a look at the novel […]<\/p>\n<\/a>","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_mi_skip_tracking":false,"_monsterinsights_sitenote_active":false,"_monsterinsights_sitenote_note":"","_monsterinsights_sitenote_category":0,"footnotes":""},"categories":[1],"tags":[],"class_list":{"0":"post-2188","1":"post","2":"type-post","3":"status-publish","4":"format-standard","6":"category-uncategorized","7":"h-entry","8":"hentry"},"_links":{"self":[{"href":"http:\/\/www.brianarner.com\/weblog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/2188","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"http:\/\/www.brianarner.com\/weblog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"http:\/\/www.brianarner.com\/weblog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"http:\/\/www.brianarner.com\/weblog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"http:\/\/www.brianarner.com\/weblog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=2188"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"http:\/\/www.brianarner.com\/weblog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/2188\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"http:\/\/www.brianarner.com\/weblog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=2188"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"http:\/\/www.brianarner.com\/weblog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=2188"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"http:\/\/www.brianarner.com\/weblog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=2188"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}